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Abstract
This paper examines the properties of G-7 cycles using a multicountry Bayesian panel
VARmodel with time variations, unit specific dynamics and cross country interdependences.
We demonstrate the presence of a significant world cycle and show that country specific
indicators play a much smaller role. We detect di?erences across business cycle phases
but, apart from an increase in synchronicity in the late 1990s, find little evidence of major
structural changes. We also find no evidence of the existence of an Euro area specific cycle
or of its emergence in the 1990s.
1 Introduction
There is abundant evidence that economic activity in developed countries share a number of
characteristics. For example, the real business cycle literature has demonstrated that macro-
economic fluctuations across countries are closely linked (see e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1995), Baxter (1995), Canova and Marrinan (1998)) while more structured time series analy-
ses have shown that a large portion of regional and country specific fluctuations are common
(see e.g. Gregory et al.(1997), del Negro (2000), Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) and Kose et al.
(2003)) and that a number of linear and non-linear business cycle features among industrialized
economies are similar (Harding and Pagan (2002)). Although all existing evidence suggests the
presence of a common source of fluctuations in developed countries, results are typically derived
using restrictive or conventional assumptions about the nature of the dynamic relationships.
In fact, except for Del Negro (2000) or Kose et al. (2003), the issue of whether commonalities
are present or not is examined within an empirical framework which does not explicitly allow
for cross-country and cross-variables interdependencies.
Recently, the stability of the cross-country business cycle relationships has come under
scrutiny. For example, Doyle and Faust (2002) and Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) suggest that
the increase in cyclical synchronization observed after 2000 in the advanced economies is the
result of common shocks. This apparently represents a major shift relative to the 1980s where
the increased similarities in macroeconomic fluctuations were the result of improved trade
relationships (see e.g. Canova and Dellas (1992), Rose and Frankel (2000)). It also represents
a somewhat di?erent propagation mechanism from the one used to explain the transmission of
US shocks to Asia (see Mackowiak (2003)) or Latin America (Canova (2001)). On the other
hand, Stock and Watson (2003) document changes in the volatilities of G-7 business cycles in
the 1990s and indicate that such changes may have altered the correlation among international
macroeconomic variables.
A third issue which has recently attracted attention is the behavior of European cycles in
the period leading to the creation of the European Monetary Union, both within the area and in
relationship with other developed countries. Casual observation indicates that European cycles
have displayed more synchronized movements in the 1990s and, possibly, a larger transatlantic
conformity. All in all, commentators suggest that national and/or European specific e?ects
may be slowly but surely vanishing.
Knowing whether fluctuations in the industrialized world are similar, understanding
their sources and characterizing their time variations is important for both academics and
policymakers. From an academic point of view one is interested in knowing whether business
cycle links are the result of cross countries interdependencies or common shocks. Hence, one
may welcome studies empirically documenting similarities in economic fluctuations since the
presence of a common cycle facilitates the study of the relationship between national and
international policy decisions and the state of the world economy. Policymakers monitoring
domestic or regional cycles are typically concerned with the e?ect of national idiosyncrasies
and with the consequences that their actions have on the working of international markets.
However, if variations in economic activity in countries with di?erent institutions, economic
structures or economic policies are driven by a common cause, markets more than policies are
the key to understanding the comovements in economic activity. Moreover, national or regional
policies designed to counteract world tendencies may be ine?ective. Finally, structural time
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variations may undermine the usefulness of policies which may have been e?ective in the past.
This paper breaks ground in the area by explicitly addressing three interrelated questions.
First, we ask whether G-7 cycles are driven by a common world cycle or if there is a significant
national component in the fluctuations. If the former is the case, we would like to know what
are the features of the world cycle and what drives it. Second, we are curious as to whether
there is any evidence that Euro cycles are di?erent from those we observe in the rest of the G-7
or if they have become so in the recent past. Third, we would like to know whether there has
been any tendency for G-7 cycles to become more similar in the 1990s or if, on the contrary,
they tend to be clustered along geographical, regional or other institutional characteristics.
To study these questions we employ a panel VAR model of the type developed in Canova
and Ciccarelli (2002). Their approach is useful in our international business cycle context for
at least two reasons. First, the econometric methodology is designed for large scale dynamic
models displaying unit specific dynamics and cross country lagged interdependencies and it is
flexible enough to allow for time variations in the correlation structure of cyclical fluctuations
across variables and countries. Second, the parsimonious parametrization they propose endoge-
nously produces an index structure where indicators of world and national specific cycles are
recursively constructed and dynamically span cross country interdependencies. Therefore the
specification is particularly suited to study the interrelationships and the structural changes
present in G-7 cycles and to analyze what drives the common and the idiosyncratic components
of G-7 fluctuations.
Five major results emerge from our investigation. First, we find that the common (world)
indicator accounts for a significant portion of the fluctuations in sales, industrial production,
output and employment of the seven most industrialized countries - roughly speaking, about 30
percent. Therefore, as in Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003) or Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003),
we find evidence of a significant world business cycle. We also show that this cyclical indicator
captures the more persistent portions of the fluctuations in the G-7 and that it has more
information than simple average or principal component measures obtained using G-7 GDPs
or IPs. Second, we find that country specific indicators are useful in explaining certain GDP
and employment episodes across time, but not in tracking the cyclical movements of the four
variables in the G-7 over the entire sample. Third, we do not find evidence of structural breaks
in the country indicators in the 1990s: the often cited idea that national cycles are disappearing
finds no support from our analysis. These indicators appear to be as significant in explaining
the di?erential growth rate in GDP across countries in the mid 1990s as they were in the
mid 1980s and, if anything, slightly more important. These last two results taken together
imply that movements in the world indicator have been the stable and consistent reason for the
commonalities of the fluctuations in the G-7 economies over time and that structural breaks
in both the pattern of transmission across countries and in the sources of structural shocks are
probably absent.
Fourth, we find little support for the idea that Euro cycles are di?erent from those of
the rest of the world or that a Euro area cycle is emerging in the 1990s. This result should be
contrasted with Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) and Artis et al. (2003) who instead detected
the presence of a EU cycle using IP data. Our analysis shows that the Euro signal is much
weaker when one considers a broader set of variables and that regional causes have minor
explanatory power for G-7 fluctuations throughout the sample. Fifth, we find that both world
and country specific fluctuations are much more synchronized in contractions than expansions.
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That is, the uncertainty surrounding estimates of both world and country specific indicators
is an order of magnitude smaller in the former than in the latter. Expansions tend to have
large idiosyncratic components, both across variables and countries, while declines in economic
activity have common timing and similar dynamics, both within and across countries.
We attempt to characterize the informational content of the indicators we construct using
simple correlation analysis. We document that the indicator captures a variety of influences
going from the magnitude of world trade, to the behavior of commodity prices, to the stance
of monetary policy in the G-7 and to the spending power of consumers. However, oil shocks,
US technology shocks, world financial or monetary factors and fiscal policy do not appear
to be behind the movements in the world indicator. Because the indicator captures such a
variety of sources of disturbances and endogenously allow their mix to change over time, it has
been a very stable driver of international business cycles over the 1980-2000 period. We also
document that, country indicators capture primarily the di?erential stance of monetary policy
but, in some cases, are also related to domestic money growth or US variables. Interestingly,
their informational content is not related to the stance of local fiscal policy nor to the local
spending capabilities, except for Canada.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the model spec-
ification, the technique used to construct the various indicators and the details of our testing
approach. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Panel VAR Model
The empirical model we consider has the form:
yit = Dit(L)Yt?1 + cit + eit (1)
where i = 1, ..., N refers to countries and t = 1, ..., T to time. yit is a G × 1 vector for each
country i and Yt = (y
0
1t, y
0
2t, . . . y
0
Nt)
0. Dit,j are G × G matrices for each lag j, cit is a G × 1
vector of intercepts and eit is a G × 1 vector of random disturbances. We assume that there
are p lags for the G endogenous variables.
Whenever Dit(L) is not block diagonal, the model displays cross-unit lagged interdepen-
dencies. Lagged cross-country interdependencies add considerable realism to the specification
but it is costly: the number of parameters is greatly increased (we have now k = NGp + 1
parameters in each equation). (1) displays two other important features. First, the coe?cients
are allowed to vary over time. Second, the dynamic relationships are allowed to be unit specific.
All three ingredients are crucial when one wants to study similarities, time variations in the
transmission of business cycles across countries.
It is convenient to rewrite (1) in a simultaneous equations format:
Yt = Xt?t +Et Et ? N (0,?) (2)
where Xt = ING ?X0t; Xt = (Y 0t?1, Y 0t?2, . . . , Y 0t?p, 1) , ?t = (?01t, . . . , ?0Nt)0and ?it are Gk × 1
vectors containing, stacked, the G rows of the matrix Dit and cit, while Yt and Et are NG× 1
vectors containing the endogenous variables and the random disturbances.
Since ?t varies with cross—sectional units in di?erent time periods, it is impossible to
estimate it using classical methods. Two shortcuts are typically employed: it is assumed that
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the coe?cient vector does not depend on the unit, apart from a time invariant fixed e?ect, or
that there are no interdependencies across units (see e.g. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) or Binder
et al. (2001)). Neither of these assumptions is appealing in our study. Instead, we assume that
?t can be factored as:
?t = ?1?t + ?2?t + ?3?t + ut (3)
where ?1, ?2, ?3 are matrices of ones and zeros of dimensions NGk ×N1 << N , NGk ×N ,
NGk × G, respectively and ?t,?t, ?t are assumed to be mutually orthogonal. ?t captures
movements in the coe?cient vector which are common across units and variables - for most of
this paper ?t will be a scalar; in the later part it will be a 2 × 1 vector. ?t captures country
specific movements in the coe?cient vector (roughly speaking, the fixed e?ects). Its dimension
is equal to the number of countries in the panel, N . ?t captures movements in the coe?cient
vector which are variable specific and its dimension is therefore equal to the number of variables
in each country, G. Finally, ut is an error term capturing all the unmodelled features of the
coe?cient vector (which may have to do with lag specific, time specific or other e?ects).
Factoring ?t as in (3) is advantageous in many respects. Computationally, it reduces the
problem of estimating NGk coe?cients into the one of estimating 1+N+G or 2+N+G factors.
Therefore, even when the number of interdependent cross sections of countries is large, noise
is averaged out and reliable estimates of the features of interest can be obtained. Practically,
(3) transforms an overparametrized panel VAR model into a parsimonious SUR model where
the regressors are appropriate “averages”. In fact, substituting (3) into (2) we have
Yt =Wt?t +At?t +Mt?t + vt (4)
whereWt = Xt?1, At = Xt?2, Mt = Xt?3 capture respectively, common, country specific and
variable specific information present in the VAR. As the notation makes it clear, the regressors
in (4) are combinations of lags of the right hand side variables, while ?t,?t, ?t play the role of
loadings. Using appropriate averages as regressors is common in index model literature (see
e.g. Stock and Watson (1989) or Forni and Reichlin (1998)). However, there are four main
di?erences between (4) and standard index models: the indices here are linear combinations
of right hand side variables of the panel VAR; they are therefore observable; they dynamically
span lagged interdependencies across units and variables; and they have loadings which are
allowed to vary over time.
From an economic point of view, the decomposition in (4) is convenient since it naturally
allows us to assess the relative importance of world and country specific influences for fluctua-
tions in Yt. In fact, WLIt =Wt?t plays the role of a world indicator, while CLIt = At?t plays
the role of a country specific indicator. Note that both indicators are leading Yt as they reflect
information contained in the predetermined variables of the VAR and can be constructed in
real time and recursively. Finally, note that while we treat (3) as a part of the prior, it can
be also thought as a part of the model specification. If little prior information on ?t,?t, ?t is
employed, then the small sample distributions for WLI and CLI we obtained are the same as
those obtained with classical methods on a model composed of (2) and (3).
To complete the specification we need to describe how ?t, ?t, ?t evolve over time and
the features of their distribution at time zero.
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2.1 The structure of time variations
Write (3) compactly as:
?t = ??t + ut ut ? N(0,?? V ) (5)
where ? = [?1, ?2, ?3] and V is a k × k matrix and let
?t = ?t?1 + ?t ?t ? N (0, Bt) (6)
We assume that ? = ? and V = ?2Ik, where ?2 is known; that Bt = ?1 ?Bt?1+?2 ? B¯ = ?t ? B¯,
with ?t = ?t1 + ?2
(1??t1)
(1??1) where ?1, ?2 are known; that B¯ = diag(B¯1, B¯2, B¯3), and that Et, ut
and ?t are mutually independent
In (6) the factors evolve over time as a random walk. Alternative specifications allowing
for more complex dynamics or exchangeability across units are possible (see e.g. Canova and
Ciccarelli (2002)). We stick to this simple setup since experimentation with more complicated
structures did not produce qualitatively important changes in the results. The spherical as-
sumption on V reflects the fact that the factors are measured in common units, while setting
? = ? is standard in the literature (see e.g. Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997)). The variance
of the innovations in ?t is allowed to be time varying to account for heteroskedasticity and
other generic volatility clustering that may appear in the coe?cients of several, or all, series
within and across units. Note that time invariant structures (?1 = ?2 = 0), and homoskedastic
variance (?1 = 0 and ?2 = 1) are special cases of the assumed process. The block diagonality
of B¯ is needed to guarantee the orthogonality across factors, which is preserved a-posteriori,
and hence their identifiability. Finally, independence among the errors is standard.
To summarize, the model we will use in our exercises has the hierarchical structure:
Yt = Xt??t + vt
?t = ?t?1 + ?t (7)
where vt ?
¡
0,?t? = (1 + ?2X 0tXt)?
¢
. To compute posterior distributions we need prior densi-
ties for (?, ?t, B¯). Because we want to minimize the impact of prior choices on the posterior
distribution of the indicators, we specify rather loose priors. The exact form of these priors, the
numerical approach used to compute posterior distributions and the details of the computations
are provided in appendix A.
2.2 Verifying the hypotheses of interest
To evaluate the posterior support for the three main issues of interest in the paper, i.e. whether
G-7 cycles are driven by a common world cycle; whether there has been any tendency for G-7
cycles to become more similar in the 1990s and whether cycles in the Euro area are di?erent
from those in the other G-7 countries or have become so in the 1990s, we employ two types of
evidence. First, we examine the behavior of the posterior distribution of WLIt and of CLIt
over time. Second, we compare the out-of-sample forecasting performances of restricted and
unrestricted specifications.
Since time series plots of the posterior distribution of the indicators are di?cult to read
and since, in large samples, they are likely to be well approximated by a normal distribution
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we summarize their information by reporting the median of the distribution and a 68 percent
posterior central band - the latter corresponding to one standard deviation around the mean
in classical frameworks. Visual evidence in favor or against the first and the third hypotheses
will be obtained by examining whether the 68 percent posterior band of one indicator includes
zero or not at most or all dates. Evidence in favor of time variations can be obtained when the
68 percent posterior bands includes zero in some time periods but not in others. We will com-
plement this visual information by computing the percentage of variations in the endogenous
variables due to the factors and by examining the importance of the two indicators in specific
historical episodes.
Since the model has a natural leading indicator structure, we will also examine the pos-
terior support for the three hypotheses by comparing the predictive ability of unrestricted and
restricted specifications. Predictive distributions can be compared using Bayes factors which
are equivalent to the posterior odds ratios when equal a priori weight is given to alterna-
tive models (analog of likelihood ratio tests in our context). The predictive Bayes factor is
f(Yt+? |yt,Mi)
f(Yt+? |yt,Mj) where f(Yt+? |yt,Mi) =
R
L(yt+? |?t, yt,Mi)p(?t|Mi, yt)d?t is the predictive density
for model Mi and p(?t|Mi, yt) is the prior on the parameters of model Mi. Model i is preferred
if this statistics exceeds 1. Thus, for example, in examining the similarities of cycles across
countries, Mj corresponds to a model with three observable indices and Mi to a model which
leaves the country specific component CLIt out; while in examining the di?erences of EU cycles
from non-EU cycles, Mj is model where ?t is a scalar so that WLIt has one component and
Mi is a model where ?t is a 2 × 1 vector so that WLIt has two distinct components, one for
EU countries and one for non-EU ones.
3 The Results
3.1 The data and some forecasting features of the model
For each country we use quarterly growth rates of seasonally adjusted real GDP, employment,
sales and industrial production as our basic variables. We choose this four series since they
are among the variables used by the NBER when deciding the state of the business cycle in
the US, by the CEPR when deciding the state of the business cycle in the Euro area and by
the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) when measuring business cycles around the
world.1 The sample is chosen to maximize the amount of common data and covers the period
1979:1-2002:4.
Real GDP data is measured in constant 1995 prices, except for Canada (the base year is
1997). The Japanese series starts only in 1980 and has been extended backwards using the real
GDP series measured in constant 1990 prices. Similarly, the Canadian real GDP was extended
backwards from 1981 using real GDP data with base-year 1992. The source of all data is from
the Quarterly National Accounts of OECD, except for Germany whose real GDP comes from
the Bundesbank database. We prefer this series since it explicitly takes into account the e?ects
of German unification. Employment is measured by the civilian employment index, with base
year 1995, and is from the OECD Main Economic Indicators. Sales are measured by the retail
1The NBER uses real personal income instead of GDP, but such series are not available on a quarterly basis
for all of the G-7 countries. The CEPR also looks at investment and at some other national variables like the
unemployment rate.
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sales volume index, with base year 1995, and come from OECD Main Economic Indicators,
except for the US, where the source is the Department of Commerce. The industrial production
index also has 1995 as base year and comes from OECD Main Economic Indicators. Whenever
these series are provided in non-seasonal adjusted form, we seasonally adjusted them using the
TRAMO-SEATS program. In the panel VAR we use these four series in growth rates. While
information about their long run properties may be lost, our choice avoids distortions in the
construction of the indicators due to the di?erent size of various aggregates across countries.
This is important since the procedure cannot distinguish if a 2% growth is generated in the
countries with a large level (say, the US) or with a smaller one (say, Canada).
We have conducted a number of specification searches to decide the structure of the
model. A summary of these exercises appears in Appendix B. Overall, we found that a model
which displays lagged cross country interdependencies and time variations in the factors, where
the decomposition in (3) includes three elements and V is nondegenerate is preferable to spec-
ifications which exclude these features. We would like to emphasize two important aspects of
our specification search. First, a model with lagged cross-country interdependencies has much
higher predictive ability than a model without interdependencies (predictive Bayes factor is
about 2.0). This implies that static factor models of the type employed e.g. by Stock and
Watson (1989) may miss important sources of transmission of fluctuations across countries.
Second, time variations in the factors play some role but not a very large one.
To demonstrate the ability of the model to approximate the data we present three types
of statistics. In table 1 we report the Theil-U statistics (the ratio of the one step ahead MSE
computed using the median of the posterior of our model to the one step ahead MSE of a naive
no-change univariate model) for IP and employment growth of the 7 countries. We choose to
confront the forecast of our model to those of a no-change model because more complicated
specifications, e.g. a VAR (with or without a prior) fail to improve over the no-change model
for these two variables. Clearly, the smaller the reported numbers, the larger is the forecasting
improvement of our model. The statistics are reported for two types of prior assumptions, a
non informative and an informative one. Results for the latter are slightly better, as expected
when more information is used. Nevertheless, we prefer the non informative prior, which avoids
interference with the data and does not condition much the results. Subsequent discussion and
figures are therefore based on the non informative set-up. The values of the hyperparameters
under the two types of priors are reported in the appendix.
Table 1: 1 Step ahead Theil-U statistics, 1990:1-2002:2
US JapanGermany UK France Italy Canada
IP growth 0.98 0.92 0.77 0.93 0.70 0.80 0.70
Employment growth 0.67 0.60 0.57 0.78 0.87 0.91 0.93
Sensitivity with informative priors
IP growth 0.91 0.78 0.79 1.03 0.61 0.70 0.62
Employment growth 0.46 0.48 0.56 0.52 0.70 0.84 0.69
Figure 1 reports the predicted recursive one-step ahead 68 percent central posterior bands
(dotted lines) together with the actual growth rates (solid line) for UK GDP growth, US em-
ployment growth and Japan IP growth. We choose these three series because the performance
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of the model for them is close to the median outcome in the sense that they were neither the
best not the worst tracked by our specification.
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Figure 1. Predictive ability of the model
In figure 2, we report the record of turning point probabilities for US, UK, Canada
and Germany GDP in levels. Probabilities of turning points are generated calculating the
percentage of times our model generates the pattern predicted by the following simple rule:
there is an upturn at t if gdpt?2 < gdpt?1 < gdpt > gdpt+1 > gdpt+2 and there is a downturn if
gdpt?2 > gdpt?1 > gdpt < gdpt+1 < gdpt+2 . While this rule is extremely simple and does not
make the provision for minimum length of a cycle or for consecutive turning point signals as,
for example, the Bry and Boschan (1971) procedure, it su?ces to give an idea of the ability of
the model to replicate important non-linear functions of the data. For readability, we present
probabilities of downturns with positive sign and probabilities of upturns with a negative sign.
Superimposed on the graph are the level of the series and the downturn (peak to trough) phases
as reported by ECRI.
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Figure 2. GDP levels, recession phases and Turning Point Probabilities
Table 1 shows that one-step ahead forecast for employment growth are slightly better
than those for IP growth (which is considerably more volatile). However, for both series in all
countries, our model is superior to the alternative. Gains are, on average, of the order of 20%
for IP growth and exceed 25% for employment growth. Note also that the model appears to
be particularly suited to forecast Euro area variables. We use a Diebold and Mariano (1995)
test to check for the asymptotic significance of the gain vis-a-vis a no-change univariate model:
we confirm that the forecasts of the two models are di?erent and that those of our model are
better.
The forecasting ability of the model can also be graphically appreciated in figure 1. In
general, forecasts are smooth and the model captures the direction of the movements in the
three variables reasonably well. Moreover, there are episodes when the model captures the
timing and even the size of the changes actually observed.
While our model is designed to capture the features of cycles in the growth rates, it can
also reproduce quite well turning points in the level of GDP of several of the G-7 countries.
Figure 2 shows that the model generates high probabilities of a turning point in correspondence
of the actual ups and downs of the series. In fact, it does not miss any of the recession phases
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chosen by ECRI for the four countries. However, given the simplicity of the adopted rule, it
may miss a particular turning point, like the most recent trough in the US GDP. Therefore,
while improvements are possible it is comforting to see that even with this simple dating rule
the model does not miss important recession signals present in the data.
3.2 Are G-7 cycles (more) similar?
To answer this question we plot the median and the 68 percent posterior central band for the
world indicator WLIt and for the seven country specific indicators in figure 3, all in growth
rates. The country indicators displayed include all the information common to all four variables
in each country, i.e., the one shared with the rest of the variables in the model, WLIt, plus the
information specific to that particular country, CLIit.
There are several features of figure 3 that are worth commenting upon. First, the world
indicator captures major events occurred in the last 20 years: it displays the double dip ex-
perienced by growth rate of output of several countries at the beginning of the 1980s and a
sustained growth thereafter; it captures both the US recession of the beginning of the 1990s
and the European one a couple of years later; it shows a positive trend growth in the 1990s and
drops below zero in the first quarter of 2001. According to this indicator, the 1982 recession
is the deepest of all and, apparently, the longest while the (common) growth in the 1980s was
slightly larger, on average, than the one experienced in 1990s (Japan’s poor performance in
the 1990s being partially responsible for this outcome). Second, posterior uncertainty (as mea-
sured by the size of the 68 percent band) depends on the state of the world economy. Bands
are tighter at the beginning, in the middle and at the end of the sample and these happened
to be periods when the world indicator was either negative or very close to zero. Hence, the
timing and the size of comovements across variables and countries appears to be more similar
in contraction than in expansions. This result agrees e.g. with Artis et al. (2003), who find
more synchronization in recessions than in expansions in the Euro Area.
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Figure 3. World and Country Indicators
The pattern of comovements observed after 2001 has drawn the attention of several
researchers (see e.g. Doyle and Faust (2002), Perlsmann (2002), Helbling and Bayoumi (2003)).
In particular, the high synchronicity of the downturn in the industrialized world has been
contrasted with the much slower transmission processes experienced early on and commentators
have suggested that the sources of international business cycle must have changed. While
our analysis confirms the importance of world influences in determining the extent of such a
slowdown (the world indicator is entirely responsible for the similarities in the comovements of
G-7 GDPs after that date), it also suggests that the contribution of world disturbances is not
unusual when compared with other recessionary episodes of the last 20 years. What appears
to have drawn the attention of researchers is not so much a (permanent) structural change in
the relationship but the switch in the uncertainty present in recession and expansion phases.
Third, at each t, the world indicator has little posterior probability mass in the sym-
metric region centered around zero. Therefore, there is posterior evidence that it significantly
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contributes to the comovements of the 28 variables we consider. A simple way to numerically
measure this contribution is to check how much of the variance of each of the four series is
explained by the posterior median of the world indicator. We find that, on average across
countries, the median value of the world indicator explains about 33% of the fluctuations in
the growth rate of GDP, about 56% of the fluctuations in employment growth, 17% of the
fluctuations of IP growth and 15% of the fluctuations of sales growth. Similarly, we find that
30% of the fluctuations of the four variables within countries are explained by the indicator,
with France (46%) and Japan (23%) being the two opposite extremes. The numbers for GDP
are surprisingly similar to those reported by Kose et al (2003) for G-7 countries (36%), despite
the fact that the sample and the frequency of the data they use is di?erent. Hence, the changes
experienced by the world economy over the last 20 years have not altered the importance of
common influences in shaping international business cycle dynamics.
Fourth, the 68 percent posterior band of country indicators includes zero at most dates.
This means that their explanatory power for G-7 fluctuations in the last 20 years is probably
minor. To put this observation in another way, national variables display important fluctuations
but the source does not appear to be distinctively national; rather, world wide influences seem
to be the reason behind this commonality. Also for country indicators, posterior uncertainty
is significantly smaller in downturns than in upturns. Hence, asymmetries in business cycle
phases are also present at national level, with synchronicity being stronger in downturns than
upturns.
To explicitly evaluate the contribution of country indicators to cyclical fluctuations in the
G-7 economies, we plot in figure 4 the growth rate of GDP (xxGDPG, where xx is the acronym
of the country), the median value ofWLIt (WLI) and the median value ofWLIt+CLIt for each
country (WCLI xx). Sizeable di?erences between the two indicators will emerge when country
specificities are of relevance. One can observe that in the US, Japan and Canada, country spe-
cific idiosyncrasies are important in explaining movements in the growth rate of domestic GDP
for the period 1983-1990 and, to a smaller extent, in the late 1990s. Confirming conventional
wisdom, national specific reasons appear to be behind the poor growth performance of Japan
in the late 1990s.
The country specific indicator adds little to explain GDP growth movements in Germany
and Italy: roughly speaking, it captures high frequency movements in GDP growth but little
else. In France, it significantly deviates from the world indicator in the middle of the 1980s and
especially in the late 1990s - in the earlier episode on the negative side, in the more recent one on
the positive side. In the UK, country specific disturbances appear to be crucial in capturing the
downward trend in GDP growth experienced over the 1986-1992 period and have some power
in explaining the above average growth rate experienced in the mid-1990s. Finally, the picture
shows that the world indicator captures low frequency comovements in G-7 countries, while
country specific indicators tend to replicate more high frequency type fluctuations. In fact,
the AR(1) coe?cient of the posterior median of the world indicator is 0.91, while the AR(1)
coe?cient of the posterior median of the country indicators varies from 0.60 for Germany to
0.83 for Canada, with Italy and France close to the lower end. Very similar conclusions are
obtained examining employment growth fluctuations across countries.
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Figure 4. Actual GDP growth and posterior medians of the indicators
To formally examine whether G-7 cycles are similar, we compare the predictive ability
of two models: one without country specific components (Mi) and one which includes them
(Mj). The predictive Bayes factor is 0.90 suggesting that country indicators have some role
in explaining the dynamics of the data. To understand the meaning of this number, note that
one should have a prior odds in excess of 1.11 (attributing 0.53 or more a-priori probability
on the model without country specific indicators) to have mild posterior evidence against the
existence of country specific cycles. The predictive power of country specific indicators comes
almost entirely from the mentioned above episodes. In fact, if we repeat the exercise using
only data for the 1990s Bayes factor drops to 0.86, suggesting a higher role for the country
component.
Are national cycles disappearing? Figure 3 indicates that there are significant time vari-
ations in the posterior distributions of both the world and the country specific indicators. The
most evident one concerns the varying level of uncertainty present in recessions and expansions.
Another appears to be the decline in the uncertainty surrounding both types of indicators over
time. Finally, country specific indicators have become slightly more synchronized and, mar-
ginally, more significant in the last decade - probably as a result of greater synchronization in
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the ups and downs of domestic variables.
While some of these observations have important policy implications - the decline in
national uncertainty suggests that the information contained in GDP may su?ce to charac-
terize the state of the local economy - and others require further study to sort out alternative
explanations - is the slight increase in domestic synchronization the result of policy actions, of
domestic specialization, of increased similarities in the sectorial shocks hitting the economies
or simply of reduced uncertainty connected with a specific growth episode? - the evidence
denies the presence of significant breaks in the structure of comovements across the two parts
of the sample. The 1980s are not di?erent from the 1990s as far as sources of business cycles
are concerned: national cycles played some role in both decades and their importance does not
seem to be vanishing over time.
This result is not necessarily in contrast with any idea concerning the globalization
of markets. Conventional wisdom suggests that more globalization should bring a stronger
synchronicity in the business cycles of the industrialized world following an increase in trade.
However, the possibility of easy trade may also make local production more specialized (along
the lines of standard static or dynamic comparative advantage). Specialization may therefore
bring less synchronicity in production. There is no reason to expect one of the two e?ects to
dominate the other, and one can envision scenarios where increased globalization leaves the
synchronicity of G-7 cycles una?ected.
3.3 Are European cycles di?erent?
One reason for the increased significance of country indicators in the latter part of the sample
could be the emergence of a regional element in the fluctuations. For example, if European
cycles tend to deviate from say, Rest-of-the-world (ROW) cycles in the late 1990s, the presence
of one world indicator may result in significant country specific indicator, because of omitted
variable bias. This suspect is partially confirmed by the fact that France and the UK are the
countries which display the most significant country specific indicators in the late 1990s and
by the analyses of Lumbsdaine and Prasad (2003), who find high correlations of EU industrial
production indices with the EU factor they construct.
We therefore repeated our exercise allowing for 2 × 1 vector of world indices: one for
Euro area countries (France, Italy and Germany) and one for the Anglo-Saxon countries. The
rest of the model is unchanged. We decided to leave Japan out of the two groups since the
synchronicity of Japan and the other G-6 cycles dramatically declines from the mid-1980s
when other East Asian countries (Korea, Taiwan, China) became the major trading partners
of Japan. We also experimented including Japan in a rest of the world (ROW) cycle and
switching the UK into the European group, despite evidence of some diversity of Euro area
and UK cycles (see e.g. Harding and Pagan (2002) or Artis et al. (2003)). We settled on the
above specification since Bayes factors always preferred it and, in both cases, by a large margin.
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Figure 5. EMU and Anglo-Saxons Indicators
Figure 5 presents the time path of the median and 68 percent posterior central bands
for the two regional indicators. Four features of the figure stand out. First, the posterior band
of the Euro area indicator almost always includes zero. In fact, out of the 92 data points in
the sample, the posterior 68% band excludes zero only once (at the beginning of the 1990),
roughly one percent of the times. Hence, there is little posterior evidence of a significant Euro
area indicator. Second, there also little posterior evidence that Euro area cycles di?er from
the Anglo-Saxon ones: the overlap of the two posterior distributions at each t is substantial.
Third, the evolution of the median of the posterior of the two indicators is similar in both the
1980s and the 1990s. Therefore, there is no posterior support for the idea that Euro area cycles
became more important in the later part of the sample. Finally, also with this specification,
posterior uncertainty is very much reduced during contraction phases. This result is important:
the large posterior uncertainty present in the two indicators for most of the sample cannot be
due to the lack of information in the two aggregates. That is, enlarging the number of countries
in the Euro area group may make uncertainty smaller during expansions phases, but it will not
change the basic conclusions significance with respect to the significance of Euro area indicators.
We formally examine whether the inclusion of a Euro area indicator improves the perfor-
mance of the model by constructing predictive Bayes factors. If European cycles are substan-
tially di?erent from the Anglo-Saxon ones, the predictive power of a model with two indices
should be substantially superior to our original specification. It turns out that it is not: Bayes
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factor is 0.989 suggesting that the data are almost unable to identify a favored model or that
there is only a very marginal improvement in the predictive power of the model with separate
European and Anglo-Saxons indicators. Given the evidence in figure 5, this is not surprising:
even though one extra degree of freedom is gained, the uncertainty in the estimates is so large
that the predictive ability does not necessarily improve.
While the lack of a Euro area cycle may appear surprising, it is worth stressing that
our finding is not unique. For example, Kose et al.(2003) find no evidence of a second world
factor, in general, and of a EU factor, in particular. Interestingly, the absence of this second
factor is demonstrated using non-Bayesian techniques. How should one then interpret the
evidence? Our favorite interpretation is the following. While Euro area aggregates display
common fluctuations across variables and economies, their source is not distinctively European.
Euro area and Anglo-Saxon fluctuations are similar in timing, size and amplitude because they
are driven by the same source of disturbances. Based on our results and those of Kose et
al.(2003) one can conclude that regional causes play a minor role in explaining comovements
in cyclical fluctuations in a large cross section of industrialized and less developed countries.
The policy implication of this result is clear: Euro area policymakers should closely monitor
the state of the international business cycle and de-emphasize Euro area (and national) cycles.
In sum, our analysis has established few important facts. First, there is evidence that
cycles in four G-7 variables are driven by a common cause. The importance of the world
indicator depends on the variable and the country. On average, it explains about 30% of
cyclical fluctuations in each of the G-7 countries. Second, while country specific causes are
useful in explaining certain GDP and employment episodes across countries and time, they do
not appear to be significant over the entire sample. Movements in the world indicator have been
a stable and consistent reason for the commonalities of the fluctuations in the G-7 economies
over time. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we do not find evidence of structural breaks
in country indicators for the 1990s (or the late part of the 1990s): the often cited idea that
national cycles are disappearing finds no support from our analysis. In fact, national indicators
are probably as important to explain the di?erential growth rate in GDP across countries in
the mid 1990s as they were in the mid 1980s. Hence, sources of comovements in G-7 variables
do not appear to have dramatically changed over the last 20 years. What appears to change is
the uncertainty surrounding the state of the world business cycles in recessions and expansions.
Since our approach is a reduced form one, we can not tell whether these di?erence are due to
the structural reasons or to increased idiosyncrasies over expansion phases. Third, we find little
support for the idea that Euro are cycles are di?erent from those of the rest of the world or
that a Euro area cycle is emerging in the 1990s. Overall, regional causes appear to be of minor
importance in explaining G-7 cycles.
3.4 What drives the World indicator?
Before we discuss the informational content of our world indicator, we first examine how it is
related to simple arithmetic averages of GDP, IP, employment or sales growth in the G-7. If
the behavior of the world indicator we construct can be reproduced with such simple measures,
our more complicated setup can be clearly dismissed. We find that such measures share some
informational content with our indicator but the overlap is far from perfect. In fact, the point
estimate of the bivariate correlation between the posterior median of the world indicator and
the simple average at each point in time of the 7 countries’ GDP, IP, employment and sales
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growth rates are 0.58, 0.64, 0.67, 0.37 respectively.
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Figure 6. World Indicator, principal components and averages
Similarly, we find that our indicator is correlated with the principal component of GDPs,
IPs, employment and sales growth although the association is less strong (point estimates
0.37, 0.35, 0.54, 0.01). Figure 6 graphically provides evidence of this association for GDP and
employment growth: the principal component is typically much more volatile than our indicator
while simple arithmetic average measures occasionally miss important cyclical movements in
the data. Our world indicator is the smoothest and mimics the local trend present in the data
better than these standard measures.
To study the informational content of the world indicator we computed a number of
simple correlations. Since these correlations are non-structural they are only as suggestive of
the possible sources of cyclical movements captured by our world indicator. We have computed
correlations with the growth rate of the US real personal non-agricultural income, the growth
rate of world commodity price index, the NYSE stock return index, the growth rate of the
world market crude petroleum price, the growth rate of the world goods trade, the quarterly US
technology shock extracted by Gali, Lo´pez-Salido and Valle´s (2003), the average spread between
US and other G-7 short term interest rates, both real and nominal, the average growth rates
of real private consumption to GDP ratio, real e?ective exchange rates and M3, and average
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G-7 government deficit.
Is the world indicator a stand-in for oil shocks, technology shocks or other types of supply
side disturbances? The answer is mixed. While we find that the correlation between the world
indicator and commodity prices is significant2 although not very large (point estimate 0.27), the
one of oil prices and US technology shocks is small and insignificant (point estimates 0.05 and
-0.05). Similarly, the correlation with real exchange rates is low and insignificant. Therefore,
while oil shocks may be an important source of national disturbances, and technology shocks
in the US may explain an important portion of US fluctuations, it is necessary to go beyond
these disturbances to explain and interpret existing world business cycles.
Does the world indicator capture fluctuations originating in financial or monetary mar-
kets or the stance of fiscal policy? Once again, the answer is mixed. While the correlation
with US stock returns, average G-7 government deficit and average growth of M3 is small and
insignificant (point estimates -0.08, 0.10 and 0.15 respectively), the world indicator appears to
be significantly correlated with the average short term real and nominal interest rate prevailing
in the G-7 (point estimates 0.28 and 0.57, respectively).
Besides average nominal interest rates and commodity prices, what else is behind the
movements of the world indicator? It appears that the world trade (point estimate 0.50),
the average consumption/output ratio (point estimate -0.46) and US personal income (point
estimate 0.27) are the variables with the most significant correlations. Interestingly, as in
Cochrane (1994) we find that the consumption/output ratio is almost as good as any other
variables in explaining common movements in the G-7.
In sum, our world indicator captures a number of influences (trade, commodity prices,
monetary policy, spending capacity) that analysts and academic investigators have indicated
to be important to understand the dynamics of business cycles in the industrialized world.
One possible explanations for the remarkable stability in its explanatory power may be that it
robustly and flexibly captures di?erent sources of fluctuations by allowing for time variations
and adaptive changes in the weights.
There are another couple of other interesting facts which our investigation has discovered.
First, there seems to be a strong negative relationship between the average explanatory power of
the world indicator for national cycles and volatility of GDP (see figure 6). Such a relationship
is at times studied in growth literature to evaluate the desirability of stable growth. In our
context, this patterns implies that synchronicity with the rest of the G-7 improves (worsens) as
the volatility of domestic GDP fluctuations is reduced (increases). Second, the world indicator
has larger explanatory power for employment than output (and larger correlation with the
average employment growth than with average GDP growth). This result squares well with
those derived by the international RBC literature where employment correlations larger than
GDP correlations are interpreted as suggestive of the presence of an important world cycle.
2Here and in the following significance means that the 95 percent band around the point estimate does not
include zero.
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Figure 7. Syncronicity and GDP volatility
We have also attempted to identify the informational content of country specific indica-
tors. We have correlated them with the individual series used in the model (the growth rate
of real GDP, industrial production, employment and real retail sales) as well as with other do-
mestic variables like the 3 month interbank nominal interest rate, the nominal yield on 10year
bonds, the real short term and long term interest rates, the growth rate of M3, the general gov-
ernment deficit, the consumption output ratio and the real exchange rate and with a few other
international variables (the US personal income, the commodity price index, the US technology
disturbances, US stock returns). We found that US personal income is significantly correlated
with all the country specific indicators. Among the other variables, short term interest rates
(either nominal or real) or money growth are those most correlated with the indicators. Inter-
estingly, the informational content of national indicators is not related to the stance of fiscal
policy in any country nor to the local consumption to GDP ratio, except in Canada.
4 Conclusions and Directions for future work
This paper studies similarities and convergence of G-7 business cycles using a panel VAR
model with cross country interdependencies and time variations. The framework of analysis is
advantageous in several respects. First, the structure is flexible and allows for multiple types of
contemporaneous and lagged comovements and for time variations in the correlation structure of
cyclical fluctuations across variables and countries. Second, the parsimonious parametrization
we use endogenously produces an index structure where indicators of world and national cycles
are observable, recursively constructed and dynamically span cross country interdependencies.
Third, the specification allows us to verify the posterior support for the hypotheses of interest
and to analyze what drives the common and the idiosyncratic components of G-7 fluctuations.
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We address three interrelated questions. First, we ask whether G-7 cycles are driven
by a common world cycle or if there is a significant national component in the fluctuations.
Second, we examine whether Euro area cycles are di?erent from those we observe in the rest of
the G-7 or if they have become so in the recent past. Third, we study whether there has been
any tendency for G-7 cycles to become more similar in the 1990s or if, on the contrary, they
tend to be clustered along geographical, regional or other institutional characteristics.
Five major results emerge from our investigation. First, we find that the common (world)
indicator accounts for a significant portion of the fluctuations in sales, industrial production,
output and employment of the seven most industrialized countries - roughly speaking, 30 per-
cent of those. We also show that this cyclical indicator captures the more persistent portions of
the fluctuations in the G-7 and that it has more information than simple average or principal
component measures obtained using G-7 GDPs or IPs. Second, we find that country indicators
are useful in explaining specific GDP and employment episodes across countries and time, but
not in tracking the cyclical movements of the four variables in the G-7 over the entire sam-
ple. Third, we do not find evidence of structural breaks in country indicators for the 1990s:
the often cited idea that national cycles are disappearing finds no support from our analysis.
These last two results taken together imply that movements in the world indicator have been
the stable and consistent reason for the commonalities of the fluctuations in the G-7 economies
over time and that structural breaks in both the pattern of transmission across countries and
in the sources of structural shocks are probably absent.
Fourth, we find little support for the idea that Euro cycles are di?erent from those of
the rest of the world or that a Euro area cycle is emerging in the 1990s. This result should
be contrasted with Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) and Artis et al. (2003) who detected the
presence of a EU cycle using IP data. Fifth, we find that both world and country specific
fluctuations are much more synchronized in contractions than expansions. That is to say, the
uncertainty surrounding estimates of both world and country specific indicators is an order of
magnitude smaller in the former than in the latter. Expansions tend to have large idiosyncratic
components, both across variables and countries, while declines in economic activity tend to
have common timing and similar dynamics, both within and across countries. This feature is
important for turning points recognition: while the information contained in the world indicator
gives a reliable downturn signal, this information is likely to be less reliable for upturn signals.
We document that the indicator captures a variety of influences going from the magnitude
of world trade, to the behavior of commodity prices, to the stance of monetary policy in the G-7
and to the spending power of consumers. Interestingly, oil shocks, US technology shocks, world
financial or monetary indicators and fiscal policy do not appear to be behind the fluctuations
of the world indicator.
Our results are important from a policy point of view for several reasons. First, since
variations in economic activity in countries with di?erent institutions, economic structures
and/or economic policies are driven by a common causes, markets more than policies appear
to be the key to understanding the comovements in economic activity. This also means that
policy institutions should probably de-emphasize national and regional cycles and instead focus
on the identification of the market(s) or channel(s) that foster cross-country transmission.
Second, since national or regional variables drive the national but not the world indicator,
policies designed to counteract the tendencies dictated by world conditions may be ine?ective.
In addition, the presence of significant time variations indicates that reliance on policy actions
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which have been e?ective in the past is doomed to failure. Third, since cyclical time variations
imply important asymmetries in the shape and the dynamics of international cycles, reliance
on standard linear models in policy analyses may miss important and pervasive features of the
data.
There are several interesting questions that our paper has left unanswered. For example,
one would like to know more about the decreased posterior variability present in both the
world and the national indicators in the late 1990s. What are the causes of this decrease?
Is it the size of the shocks which has declined, the synchronization that has increased? If it
is the latter, what can we say about the relative importance of contemporaneous vs. lagged
transmission? Similarly, one would like to know why there is such a strong negative relationship
between international synchronicity and volatility of GDP. Which way does causality go? What
factors drive this correlation? How does this square with specialization and globalization?
Furthermore, since the model tracks reasonably well the four macroeconomic variables used in
this study, one may want see whether this ability translates also in useful predictions of the
future state of the world economy at various horizons. The results reported in Table 1 for
forecasting in short horizons are promising. The exercises conducted in Canova and Ciccarelli
(2002) suggest that this could be the case using information available up to one or two years in
advance, but more evidence is clearly needed. We plan to take up all these questions in future
work.
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A Estimation
A.1 Prior information
We let B¯i = bi ? I, i = 1, 2, 3, where bi is a vector of parameters which controls the tightness
of factor i and we let p(??1,??1t , bi, ?t?1) = p(??1)p(?
?1
t )p(?t?1)
Q
i p(bi) with
p(??1) = W (z1,Q1)
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p (?t?1 | Ft?1) = N
³
?¯t?1|t?1, R¯t?1|t?1
´
(8)
where N stands for Normal, W for Wishart and G for gamma distributions, Ft?1 denotes the
information available at time t? 1, and st = 1+?2X 0tXt. The last conditional distribution also
implies the following prior for ?t
p (?t | Ft?1) = N
³
??t|t?1,R
?
t|t?1
´
where ??t|t?1 = ?¯t?1|t?1, and R
?
t|t?1 = R¯t?1|t?1 +Bt.
The prior distribution on ? is standard and can be made uninformative by letting Q1 ?
0. The priors for bi and ?t are general and can be made uninformative letting $0,?0 ? 0 and
? ? 0 respectively. The prior assumption on ?t implies that the prior for vt has the form
(vt|?t) ? N (0,?t?) where ?t ? Inv-?2 (?, st). That is, vt is distributed as a multivariate t
centered at 0, with scale matrix dependent on ? and degrees of freedom equal to ?. Such a
prior has the potential to account for unusual observations in the data or occasional extreme
parameter values which occur in our sample because of structural breaks (for example, the
breakdown of the EMU) or unexpected events (German unification). Finally, the prior on ?t
can be derived from normal initial conditions and the Kalman filter.
We collect the hyperparameters of the prior in the vector
µ =
³
z1, ?,?2,$0, ?0, ?1, ?2, vech(Q1), ?¯0, vech
³
R¯0
´´
where vech (·) denotes the column-wise vectorization of a symmetric matrix. We assume that
components of µ are either known or can be estimated in the data, for example, splitting the
sample in two pieces, using the first piece (“training” sample) to estimate the µ (by running
univariate constant coe?cients AR(p) or country by country VAR(p)) and the second to esti-
mate posterior distributions and to conduct inference. The following table reports the values
for the hyperparameters under an informative and a non informative choice:
Table 2. Prior hyperparameters’ set-up
? ?2 z1 Q1$0 ?0 ?1 ?2 ?¯0 R¯0
informative 1.0 ?ˆ2N ·G+ 20 Qˆ1 10 1 1 0 ?ˆ0 IJ
non-informative 0.0 ?ˆ2 N ·G+ 1 Qˆ1 0 0 1 0 ?ˆ0 IJ
where ?ˆ2is calculated averaging the estimated variances of NG AR(p) models, Qˆ1 is the esti-
mated variance-covariance in the time invariant version of (1), ?ˆ0 is initialized with a sequential
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OLS on (1), over the sample 1975-1980, and J is the dimension of ?t. Notice that the values
of the hyperparameters under both the informative and the non informative set-up have been
chosen mixing previous experience with the same specification (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2003)
and information contained in the sample. They provide the highest posterior density value
among other possible choices in a reasonable range.
A.2 Posterior distributions
To calculate the posterior distribution of the unknowns of the model (? = (?, bi, {?t}t , {?t}t) ,
we combine the above priors with the likelihood of the data, which, with the specification
adopted, is proportional to
L ?
Ã
TY
t=1
?t
!?NG/2
|?|?T/2 exp
"
?
1
2
X
t
(Yt ?Xt??t)0 (?t?)?1 (Yt ?Xt??t)
#
(9)
where Y T = (Y1, ..., YT ) denotes the data. Using Bayes rule, we have p
³
? | Y T
´
=
p(?)L(Y T |?)
p(Y T )
?
(?)L
³
Y T | ?
´
. Given p
³
? | Y T
´
, the posterior distribution for the components of ?, p
³
? | Y T
´
, p
³
bi | Y T
´
, p(?t | Y T ) and p
³
?t | Y T
´
, can then be obtained by integrating out nuisance
parameters from p
³
? | Y T
´
. Once these distributions are obtained, location and dispersion
measures for ? and for any interesting continuous function of them can be obtained.
For the model considered in this paper, it is impossible to compute p
³
? | Y T
´
analyti-
cally. However, we can numerically simulate a sample from it using Monte Carlo techniques.
A method which is particularly useful in our context is the Gibbs sampler since it only re-
quires knowledge of the conditional posterior distribution of p
³
? | ???, Y T
´
, p
³
?t | ???, Y T
´
,
p
³
bi | ???, Y T
´
and p
³
?t | ???, Y T
´
, where ??? denotes the vector of ? excluding the para-
meter ?, all of which can be analytically computed in our model. Under regularity conditions
(see Geweke(2000)), cycling through these conditional distributions will produce in the limit
draws from the joint posterior of interest. From these, marginal distributions can be computed
by averaging over draws.
The conditional distributions of interest are
?t | Y T ,???t , It?1 ? N
³
?¯t|t, R¯t|t
´
t ? T,
??1 | Y T ,??? ?W
?
?z1 + T,
"
,
P
t (Yt ?Xt??t) (Yt ?Xt??t)
0
?t
+Q?11
#?1?
? ,
bi | Y T ,??bi ? IG
Ã
T +$0
2
,
P
t
¡
?it ? ?it?1
¢0 ¡?it ? ?it?1¢+ ?0
2?t
!
,
??1t | Y T ,???t ? G
Ã
? +NG
2
,
?st + (Yt ?Xt??t)0??1 (Yt ?Xt??t)
2
!
,
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where ?¯t|t and R¯t|t are the one-period-ahead forecasts of ?t and the variance-covariance matrix
of the forecast error, respectively, calculated by the Kalman Filter as:
?¯t|t = ??t|t?1 + R
?
t|t?1 (Xt?)
0 Ft
³
Yt ?Xt???t|t?1
´
R¯t|t = R?t|t?1 ? R
?
t|t?1 (Xt?)
0 Ft (Xt?)R?t|t?1
Ft =
³
(Xt?)R?t|t?1 (Xt?)
0 +?
´?1
.
and ?it is the ith-subvector of ?, with i = 1, 2.
Using posterior draws, the posterior distributions of ?t and ?t can be estimated using
kernel methods and, in turns, the posterior distributions ofWLIt and CLIt and/or the posterior
distribution of the importance of the common components in explaining cyclical fluctuations
can be obtained. For example, the posterior mean ofWLI can be approximated by 1H
P
hWt?ht
and a credible 68% interval can be obtained ordering the draws of WLIht for each t.
Because we are not directly sampling from the posterior, it is important to monitor that
the Markov chain induced by the sampler converges to the ergotic (posterior) distribution.
We have check convergence in several ways: increasing the length of the chain, splitting the
chain in two after a burn-in period and calculating whether the mean and the variances are
similar; checking if cumulative means settle at some value. The result we present are based on
chains with 24000 draws: 600 blocks of 40 draws were made and the last draw for each block
is retained after the discarding the first 4000. This means that a total of 500 draws is used at
each t to conduct posterior inference.
B Specification searches
We have conducted a number of preliminary checks on the nature of the model to examine if all
the bells and whistles we have included in the specification are really necessary to capture the
dynamics of the variables under consideration. In particular, we have examined whether the
factorization (3) is exact or not and whether the presence of international interdependencies is
necessary to capture the dynamics of the four time series for the G-7 countries. Verification
of these hypotheses is important because the specification can be considerably simplified if the
factorization is exact and interdependencies are absent. The first hypothesis is examined by
checking whether the posterior distribution of ?t is centered around one. The importance of
interdependencies is examined by running two di?erent models, one with interdependencies
and one without, and using Bayes factors to evaluate the relative quality in approximating the
data.
The posterior distribution of ?t is presented in figure A.1: the evidence indicates, that
for most of the sample, the factors we use su?ce and little more is left in the error term. On the
other hand, the Bayes factor for a model with and without interdependencies is 2.06 indicating
that interdependencies are important to capture the dynamics of G-7 cycles. Intuitively, this
means that lagged transmission is as important as contemporaneous comovements in generating
common fluctuations in the G-7.
We have also examined the performance of a model with three vectors of indicators (a
world, a country specific and a variable specific) against a model with only a world and country
specific indicators. The Bayes factor in this case is 1.02, suggesting that the contribution of
30
the third vector of indices is small. In economic terms this means that the dynamics of the
four variables of the system are relatively similar, a comforting result since sales, employment,
industrial production were chosen because they were suspected to be su?ciently coincident
with GDP not only in the US (as the NBER practice indicates) but also in the other G-7
countries.
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
2.8
Figure A.1. Testing exactness of the factorization
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